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Abstract. In a series of works Hubert Dreyfus argues that phenomenological 
considerations can show the falsity of John McDowell’s claim that ours actions are 
permeated with rationality. Dreyfus changes the details of his objections several times 
in this debate, but I shall argue that there is an implicit false assumption lurking in 
his thinking throughout his exchanges with McDowell. Originally Dreyfus proposed 
a distinction between “detached rule-following” and “situation-specific way of 
coping,” and later he replaces it with the distinction between “subjectivity” and 
“absorbed coping.” He then uses this framework to interpret some examples, 
attempting to show that they cannot be accommodated by McDowell’s position. I 
shall argue that in doing so Dreyfus presupposes too narrow conceptions of 
“rationality” and “mindedness,” and if these notions are understood appropriately, 
we can see that phenomenological considerations can be good supplements, rather 
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Self, Action, and Passivity 
1. Introduction 
Since 1970s, phenomenologist Hubert Dreyfus (1978, 1992, etc.) has undertaken the 
task of articulating the correct paths to understand the human mind mainly through 
his critique of artificial intelligence. Recently he opened a new debate specifically 
over rationality and action with John McDowell. McDowell (1996, 2007a, b) holds 
that our movements of limbs, qua parts of intentional actions, are conceptual and 
therefore rational all the way out, but Dreyfus (2001, 2006, 2007a, b) dissents. The 
present paper is a critical notice on this ongoing debate. 
A few words about my strategy: the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell 
makes up a continuous dialogues: Dreyfus’s Pacific APA Presidential Address 2005 
was responding to McDowell’s earlier works; new exchanges occurred later, and 
Dreyfus did not reach his stable framework until the final response. Therefore, it 
would be onerous and ineffective to go through the discussions with the original 
sequence. I shall instead offer a two-stage presentation of Dreyfus’s objections; first 
its general structure, and then its details. This means that sometimes I will fit 
Dreyfus’s earlier points and examples into his later, stable framework. The 
motivation is to present Dreyfus at his best.1 
The structure of my discussion is as follows. In section 2 I introduce different 
notions of “passivity,” invoking them to mark the crucial difference between 
Dreyfus and McDowell. Section 3, which contains my main contention, explains how 
Dreyfus improves his argumentative framework, and why the improved one is still a 
nonstarter. Section 4 puts the present theme into a wider context, bringing in the 
(in)famous Myth of the Given in order to see more clearly what is at stake. Section 5 
is a general conclusion, where some morals of this discussion will be drawn. 
 
2. Understanding Passivity 
The notion, or notions of “passivity” do not often figure in philosophical discussions 
explicitly, but they are indeed central to many issues in philosophy. Thanks to the 
success of modern sciences, many of us regard nature as disenchanted; there are 
countless events in this disenchanted nature, and they are in a significant sense 
passive: given certain natural laws and certain initial conditions, certain events follow. 
                                                          
1  McDowell’s responses to Dreyfus have been reprinted in one of his two new paper collections. I shall 
nevertheless refer to his original publications in Inquiry, since they appeared with Dreyfus’s two pieces, and it is 
easier for readers to refer to if I stick to the original versions. 
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There is no “elbow room,” to use a metaphor made popular in relevant issues by 
Daniel Dennett (1984). There is still a long way for sciences to go, to be sure, but 
many of us agree on this scientific outlook generally. 
Puzzles arise when we consider our capacities as human subjects. We perceive, 
think, and act. None of these, however, seems to sit well with the scientific outlook. 
We are subjects, and what makes us subjects is something active: we are not like 
stones and lower animals in the sense that we can actively perceive, think, and act.2 
It is difficult to see how the active aspects, no matter how we understand them, can 
fit into the scientific outlook in general. For those who do not want to give up the 
very idea of “subjectivity,” nevertheless, it is necessary to reconcile the active and 
the passive elements. On the face of it, activity (or probably better, spontaneity in a 
broad sense) and passivity are outright incompatible with each other, so to reconcile 
them it seems we must rethink both. In this paper I embark on this task by 
considering a series of recent exchanges between Dreyfus and McDowell, as briefly 
introduced in the first section. 
Let me introduce some backgrounds of the debate first. Over some decades 
McDowell has developed a highly systematic account of intentionality and 
justification, and the account involves miscellaneous elements of our philosophy 
traditions. For my purposes, I shall simplify his central claim as follows: conceptual 
capacities are inextricably involved in our perceptual experiences. This is grounded 
by arguing that it is Kantian spontaneity, i.e. conceptual capacities, that are 
responsible for both intentionality and justification. This is not an uncontroversial 
point: in both intentionality and justification, many philosophers think that there are 
certain non-conceptual elements in play. On the one hand, because it seems (at least 
for some) that there needs to be a relatively unshakable foundation of empirical 
knowledge, the foundation itself, perceptual experience, must be non-conceptual, for 
to be conceptual is to be contaminated by human thoughts.3 On the other hand, 
because perceptual experience is about the world, it seems that the world must in 
some sense provide materials for perception. So, the thought goes, there must be 
something extra-conceptual to be divided up by our conceptual grids. These are just 
two examples of the various motivations of the views objected by McDowell.4 
                                                          
2 Things become very complicated and fuzzy when it comes to lower animals. For one thing, this notion covers 
too many species; for another, many people think that lower animals can actively perceive and act (maybe not 
think). I will say something about this in passing. 
3 Another motivation is the fact that we seem to share basic perceptual capacities with animals and human 
infants. This is part of Dreyfus’s case against McDowell. 
4 I do not back up these sketchy descriptions with McDowell’s huge previous works for I do not want to distract 
the readers. In debating with Dreyfus, McDowell offers his own summary for relevant aspects of his philosophy, 
which will be quoted later. Another thing to be noted is that though Dreyfus and McDowell debate about 
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One would probably expect that this “conceptualism” could be naturally 
extended to the case of action. Action also mediates mind and world, though with 
opposite directions. To phrase this in John Searle’s term (1983), they have different 
“directions of fit.” And this expectation is encouraged by McDowell’s own remarks 
in LectureⅤof Mind and World (1996).5 He sketches his view on action by saying that 
“intentions without overt activity are idle, and movements of limbs without 
concepts are mere happenings, not expressions of agency” (McDowell 1996, p. 89). It 
should be clear that McDowell attempts to offer a parallel account for action, though 
he does not finish the project in the lectures. Perception reflects the world, action 
changes the world; perception sustains beliefs, action carries out intentions. To 
conceive a parallel story is not so unreasonable, at least at an intuitive level. 
Therefore, some philosophers start to envisage what McDowell would say, or should 
say, about action, Jonathan Dancy (2006) for example. Some other philosophers go 
even further to criticize the envisaged McDowellian account of action; Hubert 
Dreyfus is one among them. Even before entering the details of the debate between 
them, one may already feel something really intriguing about the discussions: 
traditions confront to other traditions; Germen idealism versus existential 
phenomenology, to paint with broad strokes. McDowell invokes a range of 
philosophical traditions to back up his position: Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Wittgenstein, 
and Gadamer, among others. A striking feature of this group is that 
phenomenologists are absent: Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty are not in the 
list. Dreyfus suggests that McDowell’s position is defective exactly in this respect.6 
I suggest that the notion of “passivity’” is the crux of their disagreements. To 
anticipate, Dreyfus thinks that our bodies’ capacities to cope with the world are 
purely passive, but McDowell denies this. For McDowell, our bodies are rational 
animals’ bodies, and this implies that even our embodied copings with the world are 
rational all the way down, that is, not purely passive. These two philosophers’ radically 
different conceptions of “passivity” affect their overall pictures significantly. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
conceptuality, I do not think it is the best term for the discussion. The main reason is that it would involve how 
McDowell and Dreyfus understand the notion of “concept,” how cognitive scientists understand it, and which 
conception is right. This is far beyond the scope of the present paper. In what follows I use “concept” and 
related notions in a loose way. I think the notion of “mindedness” is relatively neutral, but as a matter of course, 
every notion is theory-laden. 
5 In conversation, Alva Noë expresses his negative attitude towards this expectation. He thinks that after all, 
experience and action are quite different episodes. I recognize the fact that this expectation is not universal, but 
that will not affect my following discussions. 
6  Husserl is an exception. Dreyfus is also hostile to Husserl’s thoughts, so he regards his objections to 
McDowell as both Heideggerian and Merleau-Pontean. 
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A few words about passivity, conceptuality, and rationality:7 McDowell’s basic 
insistence is that conceptuality and rationality can be made compatible with 
passivity. At the beginning of the paper, I characterized passivity in terms of natural 
events, laws, and initial conditions, and this is relatively uncontroversial. What’s at 
issue is whether passivity entails non-conceptuality or non-rationality. In perception, 
passivity seems to motivate several versions of non-conceptualism; now in action, 
Dreyfus’s position is parallel to those in perception. But Dreyfus’s objections are still 
unique in the sense that they are rooted in the phenomenological tradition, and in 
what follows I am going to focus on Dreyfus’s phenomenological objections in 
particular. 
 
3. Mindedness and Embodied Coping 
Let me begin by a quotation of McDowell’s summary of his own thoughts relevant 
to the present discussion: 
I have urged that our perceptual relation to the world is conceptual all the 
way out to the world’s impacts on our receptive capacities. The idea of the 
conceptual that I mean to be invoking is to be understood in close 
connection with the idea of rationality, in the sense that is in play in the 
traditional separation of mature human beings, as rational animals, from 
the rest of the animal kingdom. Conceptual capacities are capacities that 
belong to their subject’s rationality. So another way of putting my claim is 
to say that our perceptual experience is permeated with rationality. I have 
also suggested, in passing, that something parallel should be said about 
our agency. (McDowell 2007a, p. 338-339) 
We will see that McDowell and Dreyfus have very different notions of the main 
concepts appeared in this passage, such as “perception,” “concept,” “receptive 
capacities,” “rationality,” “animals,” and “agency.” These discrepancies prevent 
effective communication between them.8 
The story begins like this. Dreyfus briefly took issue with McDowell in his 
introduction to Samuel Todes’s Body and World. He writes: 
Neither Davidson nor McDowell tries to describe perceptual objects as they 
are in themselves and how they become the objects of thought. By calling 
                                                          
7 This is a response to the reviewer’s comments. 
8 McDowell himself, in his replies to Dreyfus, has attempted to clarify his relevant notions, and Dreyfus 
concedes that he misunderstood McDowell at some points. But his concessions are piecemeal, and there are still 
some significant misunderstandings lurking in Dreyfus’s final response. What I will do here is to correct the 
misunderstandings in a systematic way, and through this I hope the lurking misunderstandings will thereby be 
dislodged. 
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attention to the structure of nonconceptual, practical perception and 
showing how its judgments can be transformed into the judgments of 
detached thought, Todes is able to provide a framework in which to 
explain how the content of perception, while not itself conceptual, can 
provide the basis for conception. Thus, Todes’s Body and World can be read 
as a significant anticipatory response to McDowell’s Mind and World. 
(Dreyfus 2001, p. xvi, my italics) 
Here Dreyfus separates perception from conception. He thinks that there is 
something called “perception as they are in themselves,” as quoted above. This 
seems to beg the question against McDowell, but I think Dreyfus is unblamable at 
this point, for what he did there is to introduce Todes’s seminal work, situating it 
into certain philosophical contexts by contrasting it with McDowell’s thoughts. 
Although it will be better if he provides substantive arguments for the claim, I think 
we can be more charitable here.9 What I mainly concern is a series of debates where 
Dreyfus and McDowell engage with each other seriously. 
Dreyfus begins his real arguments against McDowell in his 2005 APA Presidential 
Address. He starts his argumentation by posing this question: “[c]an we accept 
McDowell’s Sellarsian claim that perception is conceptual ‘all the way out,’ thereby 
denying the more basic perceptual capacities we seem to share with prelinguistic 
infants and higher animal” (Dreyfus 2006, p. 43)? The positive statement of his 
position goes like this: “in assuming that all intelligibility, even perception and 
skillful coping, must be, at least implicitly, conceptual…Sellars and McDowell join Kant 
in endorsing what we might call the Myth of the Mental” (Dreyfus 2006, p. 46; italics 
altered by me). In supporting this claim, he brings in a distinction that is crucial to 
his argumentations: 
The actual phenomenon [i.e. expertise] suggests that to become experts we 
must switch from detached rule-following to a more involved and situation 
specific way of coping…Such emotional involvement seems to be necessary 
to facilitate the switchover from detached, analytical rule following to an 
entirely different engaged, holistic mode of experience… (Dreyfus 2006, pp. 7-8, 
my italics) 
Dreyfus uses some other distinctions to supplement this one, including detached 
theoretical perspective/engaged situation in the world, calculate/involve, and 
knowing-that/knowing-how (Dreyfus 2006, p. 44, p. 47, and p. 48, respectively). I 
shall focus on the one appeared in the quotation. Dreyfus assumes that McDowell 
                                                          
9 For a detailed discussion concerning the relations between Todes, Dreyfus, and McDowell, see Joseph Rouse 
(2005). 
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regards actions as detached rule-following, but he never tells us why he thinks that. 
Moreover, we have positive reasons to think otherwise. In his critique of Saul 
Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein (Kripke 1982), McDowell painstakingly disabuses 
this detached conception of rule-following. For example, he writes: 
[Kripke’s] line of interpretation gets off on the wrong foot, when it credits 
Wittgenstein with acceptance of a “skeptical paradox”… the reasoning that 
would lead to this “skeptical paradox” starts with something Wittgenstein 
aims to show up as a mistake: the assumption, in this case, that the 
understanding on which I act when I obey an order must be an interpretation. 
(McDowell 1984/1998, p. 236) 
Kripke conceives understanding as a species of interpretation, so whenever I use the 
“plus” function, I can interpret my past usages of it so as to conform other deviant 
functions, hence the paradox. McDowell urges that the source of the paradox is the 
detached conception of rule-following: we need to do interpretation when our 
understanding is functioning. The problematic picture is that there are some 
freestanding mental items that have no normative relations with the external world, 
so we need interpretations to build up these relations. It is this detached picture, 
McDowell submits, that generates the skeptical paradox. He further connects his 
critique to Wittgenstein’s notions of “practice,” “custom,” and “form of life.” It is not 
clear, at least for me, why Dreyfus does not regard McDowell as an ally at least in 
this respect.10 
The dichotomy between detached rule-following and involved skillful coping 
seems to be dubious, and it is precisely what McDowell disagrees with when he 
writes that “[w]e find ourselves always already engaging with the world” (McDowell 
1996, p. 34).11 What concerns Dreyfus is actually congenial to McDowell. Dreyfus 
admits this misunderstanding in his reply, “The Return of the Myth of the Mental” 
(2007a, p. 353): “I did assume, accepting the traditional understanding, that 
McDowell understood rationality and conceptuality as general. I should have known 
better. I’m sorry that I attributed to McDowell the view of rationality he explicitly 
rejects in his papers on Aristotle.”12 Unfortunately, Dreyfus lapses again ten pages 
                                                          
10 For McDowell’s characterization and criticisms to the “sign-post” conception of mental items and its relation 
to interpretation, see his 1993/1998, especially p. 264-5. 
11 The reviewer reminds that this remark of McDowell appears in the context of contrasting the so-called 
“sideways-on view” and McDowell’s own view, as opposed to the context concerning detachment and 
engagement. However, I believe what McDowell says there can be applied naturally to his discussions with 
Dreyfus, since the sideways-on view can be seen as another version of the detachment view. 
12 Dreyfus mentions Aristotle because he and McDowell conduct the discussion by focusing on Aristotle’s 
notion of “Phronesis.” Since they have reached agreement at this point, I shall not talk more about it here. I 
relate the discussion to Kripke and Wittgenstein instead, for the connection is relevant but missed in their 
exchanges. 
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later, when he contrasts “detached conceptual intentionality” with “involved motor 
intentionality” (Dreyfus 2007a, p. 363). I am puzzled by this: Dreyfus first claims, 
rightly, that he and McDowell agree that conceptuality is situation-dependent; that 
is, not general or detached. But after that he, in the very same paper, describes 
conceptual intentionality as detached. Therefore, I don’t see decisive progress in 
Dreyfus’s first reply. I am not saying that there is no progress there, to be sure, but 
Dreyfus still preserves the general structure from his Presidential Address. It can be 
dubbed the “detachment/involvement” distinction.13 
Dreyfus replaces this structure with a new one in his second reply. Now the 
crucial distinction is constituted by “subjectivity” and “absorption”: 
[There is] a deep issue dividing us – an issue that is obscured by my failure 
to distinguish explicitly absorption and involvement. 
I should have argued that subjectivity (not detachment) is the lingering 
ghost of the mental… (Dreyfus 2007b, p. 373, my italics) 
In this final response, Dreyfus realizes that it is inappropriate to saddle McDowell 
with the notion of “detachment,” and he proposes that it is “subjectivity,” which he 
means the operation of “subject” or “agent,” that is at fault. Besides, realizing that 
McDowell can accommodate the phenomena of “involvement,” Dreyfus submits 
that it is “absorption,” that is, “involved coping at its best” (Dreyfus 2007b, p. 373, my 
italics), that shows the falsity of conceptualism. This completes my characterization 
of Dreyfus’s stable framework. Now I turn to the details of his objections.14 
The final version of the general framework is the “subjectivity/absorption” 
distinction. By “subjectivity” Dreyfus means “agency,” which is “the lingering ghost 
of the mental” (Dreyfus 2007b, p. 373) according to him. As to “absorption,” he 
writes that “[i]n fully absorbed coping, there is no immersed ego, not even an 
implicit one” (Dreyfus 2007b, p. 374, my italics). And he further adds that “in 
attentive, deliberate…action an ego is always involved” (Dreyfus 2007b, p. 374, my 
italics). Notice that before Dreyfus reaches this final version, the notion of “attention” 
                                                          
13  As the reviewer reminds, we might read Dreyfus as connecting detached conceptual intentionality to 
Gadamer’s “free, distanced orientation.” However, I think this is over-charitable, for Dreyfus always insists on 
the distinction between rationality and skillful coping, and detachment/involvement is used to label that 
distinction. If so, then he still does not recognize the possibility of non-detached rationality.  
14 Since I promised to present Dreyfus’s best position, readers might wonder why I still criticize his early view 
in these paragraphs. By that promise, I mean I will not go through the details in Dreyfus’s early view, since it is 
not as good as the later one, and readers can check Dreyfus’s own old paper by themselves. But I still think that 
some preliminary replies on McDowell’s behalf should be made before moving to Dreyfus’s later position, for 
there are some important similarities between the early and the later views. I beg my readers’ patience here. 
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and the like has occupied a central place in his objections, including his favorite 
example, Chuck Knoblauch: 
As second baseman for the New York Yankees, Knoblauch was so 
successful he was voted best infielder of the year, but one day, rather than 
simply fielding a hit and throwing the ball to first base, it seems he stepped 
back and took up a “free, distanced orientation” towards the ball and how 
he was throwing it – to the mechanics of it, as he put it. After that, he 
couldn’t recover his former absorption…Interestingly, even after he 
seemed unable to resist stepping back and being mindful, Knoblauch could 
still play brilliant baseball in difficult situations – catching a hard-hit 
ground ball and throwing it to first faster than thought. What he couldn’t 
do was field an easy routine grounder directly to second base, because that 
gave him time to think before throwing to first. (Dreyfus 2007a, p. 354) 
The notion of “attention” and the like play a heavy role in Dreyfus’s objections 
through out the whole debate. Here is another example15: 
[We] are only part-time rational animals. We can, when necessary, step 
back and put ourselves into a free-distanced relation to the world. We can 
also monitor our activity while performing it…But monitoring what we are 
doing as we are doing it…leads to performance which is at best competent. 
(Dreyfus 2007a, pp. 354-355, my italics). 
This line of argumentation, nevertheless, is both uncharitable as an interpretation 
and ungrounded as a thesis. Consider the passage McDowell first invokes the notion 
of “stepping back”: 
Consider someone following a marked trail, who at a crossing of paths 
goes to the right in response to a signpost pointing that way. It would be 
absurd to say that for going to the right to be a rational response to the 
signpost, it must issue from the subject’s making an explicit determination 
that the way the signpost points gives her a reason for going to the right. 
What matters is just that she acts as she does because (this is a reason-
introducing “because”) the signpost points to the right…What shows that 
she goes to the right in rational response to the way the signpost points 
might be just that she can afterwards answer the question why she went to 
the right - a request for her reason for doing that - by saying “There was a 
signpost pointing to the right.” She need not have adverted to that reason 
and decided on that basis to go to the right. (McDowell 2005, pp.  1066-
1067)16 
                                                          
15 There are more in p. 355, 363, 373. 
16 Dreyfus does not refer to this particular essay, but he focused on it when he prepared his earlier version 
responding to McDowell. The earlier version, “Detachment, Involvement, and Rationality: Are We Essentially 
Rational Animals?” was presented at Harvard, but I cannot quote it since it is unpublished. 
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First of all, notice that the subject in this scenario steps back and reflects on her reason 
for the action retrospectively, as opposed to Dreyfus’s subject who steps back and 
reflects on his mechanics of the action when he is carrying out the action. So the fact 
that the stepping-back screws up the expertise is not obviously relevant. Secondly, it 
is clear that “mindedness” never means “attention” in McDowell’s writings17: it 
would be insane to hold that our perceptual experiences (and actions) are attentive all 
the way out; if that were the claim, then Mind and World would be easily refuted. 
Dreyfus’s reading of McDowell strikes me as uncharitable. 
Dreyfus reminds us that absorbed coping is involved coping at its best. He should 
have acknowledged that, by similar considerations, attention, deliberation, and 
monitoring are mindedness at its best. This means that mindedness is not exhausted 
by attention and the like. To claim otherwise, Dreyfus needs to establish that 
attention is the mark of the mental. I see every reason to oppose this claim.18 
McDowell never claims that there is an immersed or implicit self in actions, given 
the close connection between the self and attention insisted by Dreyfus. The self does 
accompany intentional actions in a weaker sense that actions are within the realm of 
the conceptual or the rational. But Dreyfus disagrees. He urges that cases like the 
chess Grandmaster show that absorbed coping is in no sense rational (Dreyfus 2007b, 
p. 374). I suggest we compare that case with the case like alien hand or reflexive 
behaviors. Dreyfus is not willing to identify absorbed coping with mere reflexive 
behaviors, so presumably it still has to do with our agency.19 Dreyfus is hostile to 
this idea, for he persistently confines mindedness to the realm of the attentive. But as 
I just said, McDowell never claims that, and the claim itself is simply wrong: when 
you are not paying attention to one of your beliefs, that does not disqualify that 
belief’s status as a mental state. To concentrate on the notion of “attention” as 
Dreyfus understands it (i.e., monitoring) is a red herring. 
In identifying mindedness with the attentive, Dreyfus cannot make sense of 
McDowell’s proposal: 
                                                          
17  And McDowell never uses the notion of “mindful.” Although “mindful” and “minded” are almost 
interchangeable according to many dictionaries, “minded” is supposed to capture the passivity of the mind. This 
thought is not available for Dreyfus because he always identifies mind with attention or reflection. 
18 It would be more plausible to hold that attention is the mark of the conscious, but even this qualified claim is 
not entirely uncontroversial. Also, when philosophers make this qualified claim, what they mean by “attention” 
is much broader, e.g., they include low-level information processing, while Dreyfus uses “attention” to mean 
something like vigilance, which is much higher-level. 
19 The reviewer reminds that this point might come close to begging the question against Dreyfus. I agree, but I 
believe that I do not really beg it. I do assume that Dreyfus also wants a distinction between expertise and 
reflexive behaviors, such as knee jerk reflex, but it is difficult to imagine that any phenomenologist would deny 
this difference. 
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This pervasiveness claim, however, seems to be based on a category mistake. 
Capacities are exercised on occasion, but that does not allow one to conclude 
that, even when they are not exercised, they are, nonetheless, “operative” 
and thus pervade all our activities. (Dreyfus 2007b, p. 372, my italics) 
We are not allowed to make that conclusion, according to Dreyfus, for to claim that 
conceptuality is operative when not being exercised involves a category mistake. But 
that is not so. To say that conceptuality or mindedness is operative but not exercised 
is to insist that conceptual capacities can be activated passively. This may sound 
strange for Dreyfus or some others, but they need to tell us why that is incoherent or 
at least problematic. 
Some might think that what Dreyfus has in mind is the weaker claim that 
McDowell’s pervasiveness claim is a non sequitur, that is, does not follow from the 
fact that we can often attribute reasons for our past behaviors in retrospect 
(“supposed to follow,” Dreyfus 2007b, p. 372). If this is so, then he is surely right 
about logic. But McDowell nowhere commits this inference. It is not surprising that 
when Dreyfus makes this point, he does not have explicit citation: it is just not 
possible to find a passage that commits such a serious logical fallacy. 
Dreyfus acknowledges that “mindedness” is a technical term on McDowell’s part 
(Dreyfus 2007b, p. 374), but he does not really respect this point: he opens his 
response to McDowell by classifying “conceptuality” and “mindedness” as mentalist 
notions (Dreyfus 2007b, p. 371). “Mentalism” is a very vague term, to be sure, but to 
my knowledge none of its meanings fits McDowell’s usage. If McDowell uses 
“conceptuality” mentalistically, how can he manage to answer the charge that his 
position is idealistic in Berkeley’s sense? 
Dreyfus would presumably press this question: “if mindedness is not identical to 
a monitoring self, then what is it?” To this McDowell has an answer: 
It is a matter of an “I do”…Conceiving action in terms of the “I do” is a 
way of registering the essential first-person character of the realization of 
practical rational capacities that acting is. (McDowell 2007b, p. 367, my 
italics) 
Dreyfus objects to this, but again on the false assumption that this first-person 
character is in the realm of the attentive (Dreyfus 2007b, p. 375). What McDowell 
does mean, however, is that our absorbed coping, involved coping at its best, is not 
like cases such as alien hands. By contrast, in repudiating this first-person character, 
it is not clear how Dreyfus can leave room for the crucial distinction between 
absorbed coping and mere reflexive behaviors. Maybe he would appeal to the notion 
Philosophical Writings Vol. 44 No .1  2015 





of “motivation,” but if this move were made, it would become not clear how 
Dreyfus’s view is different from McDowell’s one.  
Dreyfus sets a dilemma between “a meaninglessly bodily movement” and “an 
action done by a subject for a reason” to McDowell (Dreyfus 2007b, p. 374). 
McDowell would escape this dilemma by insisting that (intentional) bodily 
movements are meaningful. Dreyfus would agree on this point, but it should be clear 
that this “motor intentionality” can be appropriately understood only by those who 
respect the distinction between absorbed coping and mere reflexive behaviors. 
About this ownership consideration, Dreyfus says: 
Of course, the coping going on is mine in the sense that the coping can be 
interrupted at any moment by a transformation that results in an 
experience of stepping back from the flow of current coping. I then 
retrospectively attach an “I think” to the coping and take responsibility for 
my actions.20 (Dreyfus 2007a, p. 356). 
McDowell’s explanation of this is the pervasiveness claim, but Dreyfus’s is not 
convinced. His alternative explanation is, surprisingly enough, purely physiological 
(Dreyfus 2007b, p.374). But this is problematic. For one thing, this physiological 
claim is compatible with all camps in this debate; for another, if it is the whole story 
for Dreyfus, then how can the notion of “responsibility” mentioned in the quotation 
above be explained? 
Later Dreyfus seems to radicalize his answer. In describing McDowell’s view he 
disagrees with, he writes that “to the question ‘who acts?’ [McDowell] responds: ‘the 
answer is “I do”’” (Dreyfus 2007b, p. 373). But if this is an answer Dreyfus objects to, 
he seems to have no alternative but commit that the answer is “this body does.” That 
is why McDowell argues that “[t]he real myth in this neighborhood is…the Myth of 
the Disembodied Intellect” (McDowell 2007a, p. 349). Dreyfus replies that this Myth 
is more like Gadamer’s and McDowell’s view, for “[i]t assumes that human beings 
are defined by their capacity to distance themselves from their involved coping” 
(Dreyfus 2007a, p. 355). This is not true, for what McDowell is saying is that involved 
copings are rational though unreflective; the notion of “distance” is not applicable 
here. And even if one holds this definition of human beings, it does not follow 
immediately that our mindedness is disembodied. Dreyfus rejects this because he 
mistakenly identifies mindedness with attention or deliberation. By contrast, 
McDowell can legitimately attribute that Myth to Dreyfus because “[i]f you 
                                                          
20 Here Dreyfus recognizes that the stepping back at issue is retrospective, but he lapsed earlier in discussing 
Knoblauch’s case. 
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distinguish me from my body, and give my body that person-like character, you 
have too many person-like things in the picture…” (McDowell 2007b, p. 369) That is 
to say, if both the self and “this body” are person-like things and the self is not this 
body, than it must be a disembodied person. Dreyfus does not address this objection 
at all. 
Dreyfus thinks our animal nature has no philosophically interesting differences 
from other animals. This is backed up by what McDowell identifies as the “quick 
argument”: from the premise that we share basic perceptual capacities and 
embodied coping skills to the conclusion that “those capacities and skills, as we have 
them, cannot be permeated with rationality, since other animals are not rational” 
(McDowell 2007a, p. 343). ‘But the quick argument does not work.’ McDowell 
continues, 
The claim that the capacities and skills are shared comes to no more than 
this: there are descriptions of things we can do that apply also to things 
other animals can do…But the truth about a human being’s exercise of 
competence in making her around, in a performance that can be described 
like that, need not be exhausted by the match with what can be said about, 
say, a cat’s correspondingly describable response to a corresponding 
affordance. The human being’s response is, if you like, indistinguishable 
from the cat’s response qua response to an affordance describable in those 
terms. But it does not follow that the human being’s response cannot be 
unlike the cat’s response in being the human being’s rationality at work. 
(McDowell 2007a, p. 343) 
This reflects a central thought of McDowell’s thinking: when two phenomena share 
something, we are not forced to regard this “something” as a discrete thing, “a core” 
shared by these two phenomena. “It is not compulsory,” as he likes to put it. And he 
further argues that “if we do take this line, there is no satisfactory way to understand 
the role of the supposed core in our perceptual lives” (McDowell 1996, p. 64). Here 
“perceptual lives” is of course just an example. This central thought is two-staged: 
first, the factorizing way is not compulsory, and second, it will lead to in principle 
irresolvable quandary. In the case of passivity, the devastating problem is the 
infamous Myth of the Given. 
 
4. The Real Myth of the Given 
“The Myth of the Given” was introduced and criticized by Wilfrid Sellars (1956/1997) 
in his celebrated “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.” Many contemporary 
philosophers identify the myth with indubitability, but that’s not Sellars’s original 
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formulation. 21  Now Dreyfus’s target is McDowell, not Sellars, so let’s turn to 
McDowell’s formulation of the dialectics. He first introduces the idea of the sui 
generis character of the space of reasons, compared with the realm of law. The former 
is in the “normative contexts,” whereas the latter is exhausted by the “empirical 
descriptions”: 
Sellars separates concepts that are intelligible only in terms of how they 
serve to place things in the logical space of reasons, such as the concept of 
knowledge, from concepts that can be employed in “empirical 
description”…whatever the relations are that constitute the logical space of 
nature [i.e., the realm of law], they are different in kind from the normative 
relations that constitutes the logical space of reasons. (McDowell 1996, pp. 
xiv-xv) 
And if we place something in the realm of law, but demand it to do something only 
an inhabitant of the space of reasons can do, then we commit something like the 
“naturalistic fallacy”: 
The idea of a tribunal belongs…in what Sellars calls “the logical space of 
reason”…But the idea of experience, at least construed in terms of 
impressions, evidently belongs in a logical space of natural connections. 
That can easily make it seem that if we try to conceive experience as a 
tribunal, we must be falling into the naturalistic fallacy… (McDowell 1996, 
p. xvi) 
This is how McDowell identifies the Myth of the Given. Now Dreyfus thinks his 
picture by no means falls into this Myth: 
Given its structural similarity to empiricism, we need to make clear that 
existential phenomenology does not assume an indubitable Given on which 
to base empirical certainties. As with all forms of intentionality, 
solicitations can be misleading and in responding to such solicitations one 
can be misled. (Dreyfus 2007a, p. 362, my italics) 
Notice that Dreyfus distances himself from the Myth of the Given by stressing that 
the foundations in his picture are not indubitable, but this does not respond to the 
mystical part of the Given identified by McDowell. Notice that when McDowell 
diagnoses the oscillating seesaw in modern philosophy, he never mentions 
“foundationalism.” Foundationalism, at least in its stronger form, often implies 
indubitability, but that is not the problem McDowell is identifying. The 
                                                          
21 Willem deVries and Timm Triplett make an admirable effort to gloss this formidable piece. In page xxii and 
xxiii, they point out that Sellars did not identify the myth with incorrigibility (indubitability). See Willem 
deVries and Timm Triplett (2000) 
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McDowellian problematic is constituted by coherentism and the Myth of the Given, 
not foundationalism. 
The worse thing is that later Dreyfus says something exactly fall prey to the Myth 
of the Given: 
The world of solicitations, then, is not foundational in the sense that it is 
indubitable and grounds our empirical claims, but it is the self-sufficient, 
constant, and pervasive background that provides the base for our 
dependent, intermittent, activity of stepping back, subjecting our activity to 
rational scrutiny, and spelling out the objective world’s rational structure. 
(Dreyfus 2007a, p. 363) 
It is not clear that what the “base-providing” claim amounts to, but obviously 
Dreyfus thinks solicitations have to do with our rational structures. Now how does 
he characterize solicitations as such? In the figure that he invokes to contrast 
McDowell’s notion of “world” with Merleau-Ponty’s, he writes that for 
phenomenologists the world is “[s]olicitations to act; [a] web of attractions and 
repulsions” (Dreyfus 2007a, p. 357). Later in contrasting with “affordance,” he binds 
solicitations with the notion of “drawing” (Dreyfus 2007a, p. 361). Now solicitations 
sound like something in the realm of law: in this realm there is no freedom; we are 
just drawn into these or those movements of limbs, or “expertise” in Dreyfus sense. 
Freedom kicks in when we step back and reflect, so it does not belong to solicitations, 
in Dreyfus’s sense. Dreyfus says that solicitations “can be misled” (Dreyfus 2007a, p. 
362), and this makes Merleau-Pontean world “normative” (Dreyfus 2007a, p. 357). 
But solicitations in this sense are just attractions and repulsions constituted by 
relations between objects and our bodies, which subject to the realm of law, so 
“being misled” can be only a metaphor. It is not that he explicitly holds this view, 
but what he have said about solicitation and affordance, as quoted in this paragraph, 
commit him the view I attribute to him. By contrast, McDowell’s world deserves to 
be called “normative,” for he argues that the world is encompassed by the realm of 
the conceptual, and conceptual relations are normative connectedness if anything 
is.22 
In this way, Dreyfus unwittingly commits a version of the Myth of the Given: 
solicitations are inhabitants in the realm of law, but they are supposed to “provide 
the base” for the space of reasons: “[t]hese solicitations have a systematic order 
that…works in the background to make rationality possible” (Dreyfus 2007a, p. 358, 
                                                          
22  The reviewer kindly reminds that my remarks here involve substantial philosophical claims, and it is 
necessary to engage Merleau-Ponty deeper in order to have a more complete discussion. I think, however, that 
unavoidably requires a separate, substantial piece. That’s why here I do not claim to have objections to Merleau-
Ponty. This is humility for my part, and I think this is also true of McDowell’s replies to Dreyfus. 
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my italics). Given that Dreyfus is not a bald naturalist, who is willing to bite the 
bullet of reducing the space of reasons to the realm of law, his picture is ultimately 
fall prey to the Myth of the Given. 
I find Dreyfus’s notion of the body peculiar. On the one hand, he attributes the 
body person-like characters; on the other, the body responds to only solicitations 
conceived as inhabitants in the realm of law. I see no way to reconcile these two 
elements in his picture. 
Dreyfus recognizes a problem similar to the one we are discussing: “[the 
existential phenomenologist] owes an account of how our absorbed, situated 
experience comes to be transformed so that we experience context-free, self-sufficient 
substances with detachable properties…” (Dreyfus 2007a, p. 364, my italics) But the 
problem is much more serious than this. Given that Dreyfus presumably accepts the 
sui generis character of the space of reasons, and given that his understanding of 
solicitations commits him to put them in the realm of law, the “owing an account” 
acknowledgement does not touch the real and deep problem. He goes on to accuse 
that “the conceptualists can’t give an account of how we are absorbed in the world…” 
(Dreyfus 2007a, p. 364) But this is not so. Given that McDowell never identifies 
conceptuality and mindedness with a monitoring self, cases like Knoblauch are 
simply irrelevant. Dreyfus prefers the phenomenological approach because it 
“accepts the challenge of relating the preconceptual world to the conceptual world…” 
(Dreyfus 2007a, p. 364), but what we should say is that the phenomenologist accepts 
the challenge before really appreciating it. On the contrary, while the conceptualist also 
accepts the sui generis character of the space of reasons, he puts solicitations in the 
realm of the conceptual, and this avoids the Myth of the Given and intellectualism at 
the same time (since conceptuality is not in the realm of law, and is not identical to a 
monitoring self either). 
 
5. Setting Straight the Debate 
As a dedicated phenomenologist, Dreyfus insists that “without any phenomenological 
description of just what it is like for our absorbed coping to be pervaded by 
conceptuality, it is not clear what meaning we should give to this term” (Dreyfus 
2007b, p. 372, my italics). I disagree with him at two points. First, the term 
“conceptuality” is not a phenomenal concept (if any), so it is confused to demand us 
to give it phenomenological descriptions. Second, phenomenological descriptions 
are not crucial in this kind of context. Most of us agree that we think with concepts, 
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but frankly speaking I do not feel that I am using concepts when I think. Or better, I 
have no idea what it is like to use concepts. To say that we do or do not use concepts 
on some occasions depend on non-phenomenological reasons.23 
If what I have said so far is correct in general outlines, I side with McDowell 
(2007a, p. 349) that many of Heidegger’s, Merleau-Ponty’s, and Dreyfus’s thoughts 
should be regard as supplementations, as opposed to corrections, to the 
conceptualist picture. That is, although the cases of Knoblauch and the chess 
Grandmaster are compatible with McDowell’s view, more can be, and should be 
said about these or other interesting cases. I hope the conversations between these 
two important thinkers can go on and on in better ways after my efforts to set 






The present paper evolves from ‘Towards a Conceptualist Account of Action: 
Answering Phenomenological Challenge,’ which was written when I visited U.C. 
Berkeley, fall 2006. During the visiting I attended Hubert Dreyfus’s and Hannah 
Ginsborg’s seminar, ‘McDowell and Merleau-Ponty’; I am indebted to both of them 
very much. I also gained various helpful comments from Alva Noë, who also 
attended the seminar. Dreyfus, my main opponent in this paper, cast doubt on the 
notion of ‘we’ in McDowell’s remarks that ‘[w]e find ourselves always already 
engaging with the world’ (McDowell 1996: 34): ‘who is the “we” for McDowell? A 
subject? A Kantian “I think”?’ This query reminded me about the relation between 
action and self. At that time I could not come up with a satisfying response to 
Dreyfus; the present paper is supposed to be a further and fuller answer to his 
challenge. Last but not least, I benefit from a long and critical comment from a 
                                                          
23 The reviewer points out to me that a lot of points here turn on how we understand phenomenal concepts and 
the task of phenomenology. The former requires deeper engagement with philosophers like Galen Strawson, and 
the latter, phenomenologists from Husserl to contemporaries, including Dreyfus. I appreciate this reminder very 
much, and actually that is part of my reasons to write this essay: I think the debate between McDowell and 
Dreyfus will become a paradigm of the conversation between the so-called two big traditions in the western 
philosophy, and no doubt this kind of exchange presupposes profound backgrounds on both sides. Therefore, to 
get clear about what are at stake is extremely important at the initial stage of the discussion. This is how I 
conceive my contribution here. And undoubtedly much more efforts in connecting resources on both sides are 
required. 
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reader, whose identity will not be revealed here. The comment is so negative that I 
cannot but force myself to rethink many points in this paper. Although it turns out 
that I do not agree with most of the charges, and therefore revisions are kept 
minimal, I still want to express my gratitude here. For some technical reasons, the 
paper has not come out until recently, and McDowell has updated his view on 
conceptuality in his exchanges with Charles Travis. I do not make any substantial 
revision in response to it, since I believe what is at stake between McDowell and 
Dreyfus is independent of McDowell’s updates. Also, after all these years I myself 
have changed my mind to some extent concerning conceptuality in general, but 
again it does not affect my evaluation of the McDowell-Dreyfus debate here. 
Therefore I leave the paper largely as it was. 
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